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ABSTRACT
This research offers a “helicopter view” of the Israeli pay-television
market eighteen months after Netflix’s global expansion to com-
plicate the narrative of intractable conflict between subscription
video on-demand (SVOD) platforms like Netflix and national
television industries. Using data from qualitative interviews with
ten industry executives, this article argues that relationships
between global SVODs and local television providers are more
varied than is widely believed. Israeli multi-channel executives
consider Netflix to be an indirect competitor, view Netflix the
content distributor as distinct from Netflix the content buyer, and
expect Netflix to have little impact on the national market.
Ultimately, these industry responses reaffirm the fundamental
local-ness of television even as digital technology reshapes the
relations between national and global industries.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
The global television industry has attracted a significant amount of scholarly
attention in recent years as reality formats reorganize the transnational flow
of television programming and subscription video on-demand (SVOD) plat-
forms like Netflix create new possibilities for global television audiences. Yet,
the question of how these shifts impact industrial practices within national
television industries remains contested. Furthermore, little work to date has
examined the ways in which decision makers respond to such shifts in
relation to the economic and regulatory realities of local markets. As such,
this research uses a “critical media industry studies” approach (Havens, Lotz,
& Tinic, 2009) to complicate the popular narrative of intractable conflict
between SVODs like Netflix and national television industries (Flint &
Ramachandran, 2017). Drawing on qualitative interviews with executives
working for the country’s largest multi-channel providers, this article argues
that the Israeli television industry’s relationships with and attitudes toward
Netflix are complicated and often contradictory.
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This analysis begins by reviewing the dominant industrial and scholarly
discourses regarding the relationships between global SVOD platforms and
national television industries. The following sections describe the Israeli
television market leading up to Netflix’s 2016 global expansion and detail
the ways in which Netflix established itself during its first eighteen months in
the market. After describing the methods used in this research, the findings
are presented in three parts to highlight the most common ways in which
Israeli multi-channel executives think about Netflix. First, in a general sense,
Netflix is seen as an additional source of (indirect) competition. Second,
multi-channel executives describe the consequences of Netflix’s unwilling-
ness to distribute original content in national markets after the service’s
global expansion. At the same time, some executives see Netflix’s appetite
for global content as a potential source of additional revenue to offset the
impact of subscriber attrition. Third, even though Netflix is thought to
represent significant shifts in both Israeli and global television markets,
multi-channel executives nonetheless assert that their services are largely
protected from the consequences of such shifts.
By focusing on multi-channel providers, the industry responses to Netflix
identified in this research reveal cultural and economic entanglements that
call into question reductive “post-TV” arguments based on notions of digital
disruption. Rather than expressing worries about being pushed out or
describing the challenges of remaining competitive, executive considerations
of Netflix’s entry into the Israeli pay-television market reflect that, for this
national industry, global SVOD expansion is a process, not an event. As such,
this research reveals significant new insights about the ways in which global
and local television coexist on fundamentally local terms. This article con-
cludes with a discussion that addresses the implications of these findings for
global SVOD scholarship and some thoughts regarding the direction of
future research.
Global SVOD platforms and national television industries
With more than 250 million combined subscribers, Netflix and Amazon are
major new players in the global mediascape. In 2017, these companies spent
$7 billion and $4.5 billion on video content, respectively. Although the
number of original series produced for all online streaming services increased
from just four in 2010 to 117 in 2017 (Schneider, 2018), the majority of this
growth is a direct result of Netflix’s and Amazon’s efforts to own rather than
license the content they distribute. In 2016, for example, Netflix released 126
original series or films – more than any other single American television
network or channel (Masters, 2016). At the same time, digital technology,
fragmented audiences, and the limits of advertiser-supported revenue models
are reshaping national television industries across the world. Addressing
2 M. L. WAYNE
these changes, writers in the popular press and analysts writing for industry
publications frequently link declining prime-time ratings in countries like
Australia (White, 2016) and the United States (Spangler, 2016) to the
increasing popularity of SVOD platforms. In many ways, discourses posi-
tioning the relationships between national television industries and global
SVOD platforms as a zero-sum game mirror what executives have been
saying for the past several years. In 2017, for example, Tony Hall, the director
general of the BBC, warned “the British content we value and rely upon is
under serious threat” as national investment in high-end drama has failed to
keep pace with Netflix (Ruddick, 2017).
Somemedia industry scholarship supports this narrative. Examining the case of
Netflix in Canada, Davis and Zboralska (2017) argue that the inability to properly
regulate SVOD services presents serious threats to national broadcasters. Using
a variety of evidence including publicly available documents, transcripts of gov-
ernment hearings, and leaked e-mails, these researchers convincingly argue that
Netflix’s initial claims to be a compliment to existing Canadian broadcasting
services served only to mask the firm’s true interest in deregulation and other
free market strategies. Ultimately, Canadian regulators sided with Netflix on the
grounds of their desire to increase choice for citizen consumers.
Other industry research paints a more complicated picture of the relation-
ships between national television industries and global SVOD platforms. In
her analysis of the British television industry, Steemers (2016) considers
different industry segments in their roles as content exporters over a ten-
year period. On one hand, the findings indicate that the arrival of SVOD and
“over-the-top” (OTT) services exposes the tensions between the national
orientations of broadcasters and the global aspirations of independent pro-
ducers and distributors. On the other hand, the global expansion of SVOD
platforms boosted sales of British drama although the majority of interna-
tional buyers remain located in other national markets, not global digital
distributors. Scholars have identified similarly complicated outcomes in
a variety of other national markets (see Daidj & Egert, 2018).
Industry research also demonstrates that, in some cases, SVOD platforms
have little impact on national industries. In their work addressing the South
Korean market, Kim, Kim, and Nam (2016) find little competition between
traditional pay-television services andOTT providers. They explain these results
in terms of Netflix’s limited brand awareness among Korean consumers.
Although this study was conducted before Netflix’s global expansion, it none-
theless points to the limitations of assuming global SVOD platforms possess the
ability to enter any and every national market in a meaningful way.
Yet, considerations of national television industries in relation to the emer-
gence of global SVOD platforms largely ignore the role of the multi-channel
video programming distributor (MVPD) who provide last mile service to view-
ers. When this segment of the industry is considered in contemporary research,
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the object of analysis is national pay-television markets and MVPDs are
addressed collectively (Sanz&Crosbie, 2016). This is problematic for two related
reasons. First, looking at multichannel providers it becomes clear that in spite of
television’s increasingly global realities, significant portions of national television
industries remain just that – national. MVPDs operate in particular national
contexts shaped by specific cultural and regulatory frameworks. And it is within
these frameworks that MVPDs program, advertise, and compete with each other
for their share of national consumers. Second, without an adequate analysis of
the industrial labor that shapes multichannel strategies, it is much more difficult
to observe how national industry players are responding to both the risks and the
opportunities created by global SVOD expansion.
To begin filling this gap in the literature, the pay-television market in Israel is
a useful case study for several reasons. First, Israeli consumers have historically
been early adopters of new communication technologies as evidenced by the
rapid adoption of cable television in the early 1990s (Schejter & Lee, 2007). In
addition, Israeli MVPDs were among the first providers to offer customers
digital video recorders beginning in themid-2000s (Harlap, 2017, p. 15). Second,
consumer choice in the pay-television market has expanded significantly in
recent years (Tucker, 2018). As a result of increasing competition, legacy
providers and new OTTs are increasingly looking to the global market for
content and services that they hope will help them remain competitive at
home. Third, Israeli multi-channels engage with Netflix in a variety of industrial
contexts as content buyers, content sellers, and collaborators. Given the changes
within national markets and the increasing demand for global content, the ways
in which Israeli television executives understand Netflix are particularly impor-
tant as these understandings will provide insights that speak to the broader
implications of SVOD expansion into national markets around the world.
The Israeli television market in late-2015
Like most media industries in Israel, the television industry is heavily concen-
trated and heavily regulated. From 2000–2013, the multi-channel pay-television
market of approximately 1.5 million households was a duopoly dominated by
the cable provider HOT and the satellite provider YES although themarket share
controlled by each provider has varied substantially (Schejter & Yemini, 2015,
p. 120). In terms of content, HOT’s offerings include more than 170 channels
and has one of the world’s largest VOD libraries with nearly 40,000 titles. YES
offers more than 200 channels and has a VOD library with 32,000 titles. In
addition, the in-house channel YesOh was the sole local distributor of HBO
content until early 2017. Both services have similar price points costing con-
sumers around 200–250 shekel (US$57–71) per month.
In Israel, cable and satellite television is regulated by the Cable and Satellite
Broadcasting Council which operates within the Ministry of Communications
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(MOC). As Schejter (2010) observes, electronic media regulation in Israel is
characterized by specific cultural and economic obligations. For example, as
multi-channel operators, HOT and YES are forbidden from having exclusive
distribution rights for foreign content. The only exclusivity allowed pertains to
local programming with the goal of encouraging local production and competi-
tion for quality content. In addition, both providers are required to carry
broadcast channels and several additional “must-carry” channels. Most signifi-
cantly, HOT and YES are required to spend eight percent of their gross annual
revenue producing local Hebrew-language television content.
In preparation for the arrival of OTT services, in February 2014, the MOC
appointed a ten-member public regulatory committee headed by Professor
Amit Schejter to develop recommendations for the audiovisual market.
Specifically, the committee was asked to propose a new regulatory framework
addressing the changes brought about by digital distribution. Although the
Schejter committee produced a variety of recommendations (Schejter &
Tirosh, 2016, p. Appendix 1), the MOC has not implemented any of them.
As a result, audiovisual services that do not rely on traditional cable or
satellite technology remain unregulated. It was in this unsettled regulatory
context that Israel’s largest mobile service provider Cellcom introduced
Cellcom TV, the market’s first OTT internet-based television service, in
late December 2014. Although the platform initially included broadcast
channels, some older Hebrew-language programming, and other Israeli
channels, the majority of available content was foreign series and movies
delivered through VOD. Yet, with an all-inclusive package priced at 99 shekel
(US$28) per month, Cellcom TV was significantly cheaper than either cable
or satellite service.
Not surprisingly, Cellcom’s entry into the multi-channel market was
characterized as the first meaningful challenge to legacy providers HOT
and YES. At a press conference announcing the launch of the new service,
then-Minister of Communications Gildan Erdan proclaimed, “I am excited,
like all of Israel that waited for this day” (Perez, 2014). He continued, “One of
my goals was to reach this moment in which multi-channel television
competition in Israel begins. The citizens of Israel pay too much for televi-
sion. The HOT-YES duopoly must be fought by increasing competition.” Yet,
at the end of 2015, a year after Cellcom TV’s launch and days before Netflix’s
global expansion, the HOT-YES duopoly remained largely intact with these
companies controlling ninety-five percent of the market.1
1HOT ended the year with 828,000 subscribers and fifty-four percent of the market (a four percent drop from the
previous year) (HOT, 2016, p. 10 (part B)). With 635,000 subscribers, YES controlled forty-one percent of the
market which was a slight increase from the previous year (Bezeq, 2016, p. 16). During their first twelve months
of operation, Cellcom TV acquired 70,000 subscribers giving the OTT provider five percent of the pay-TV market
(Cellcom, 2016).
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Netflix in Israel
Netflix officially entered the Israeli market on January 6, 2016 as part of the
SVOD’s expansion into 130 new territories.2 Prior to this, Israeli consumers could
only access the service through virtual private networks. Although the official
number of users was (and remains) unknown due to Netflix’s longstanding policy
of near total data secrecy, some industry insiders believed the service already had
a significant number of local subscribers. In December 2015, Uri Gal, YES’ vice-
president of marketing, claimed that before its official launch Netflix had fifty or
sixty thousand Israeli subscribers posing as Americans (Ziv, 2018). As both
existing and new Israeli subscribers quickly discovered, however, the local content
library was extremely limited. With only 143 television series and 438 movies, the
selection represented twelve percent and nine-and-a-half percent, respectively, of
the US library at the time (Ziv, 2016a). Furthermore, many of Netflix’s most
popular shows including House of Cards (2013– 2018) and Orange is the New
Black (2013– 2019) were not available through the SVOD’s platform as the
distribution rights had already been sold to local television providers. In addition,
the platform lacked a Hebrew-language user interface and it took nearly six
months for the service to begin adding Hebrew subtitles (Levy, 2016).
Nonetheless, with introductory promotional monthly subscriptions priced at
30–45 shekel (US$8–12), Netflix was significantly less expensive than Cellcom
TV, the only other low-cost option in themarket. In the Hebrew and English local
press, Netflix’s arrival was largely understood as an additional challenge to legacy
providers HOT and YES (Averbach, 2016a) even though the service’s local appeal
was significantly limited by the lack of Hebrew-language content and subtitles.
In the eighteen months following its global expansion, Netflix attempted to
increase its appeal among Israeli consumers in several different ways.
Although the platform had first introduced Hebrew subtitles for some con-
tent in June 2016, by March 2017, industry sources were telling reporters that
Netflix was in the process of creating a Hebrew-language user interface and
translating large amounts of foreign content (Perez, 2017a). Four months
later, Netflix’s Hebrew-language interface went live. In a press release, the
company noted that “over 75%” of the available content was already dubbed
or subtitled in Hebrew (Netflix, 2017b).
Parallel to these efforts to attract Israeli consumers, Netflix was also
developing relationships with different players in the Israeli television indus-
try. Less than a month after officially entering the market, Netflix purchased
its first Israeli television show – The Greenhouse (2012– 2016), a Nickelodeon
UK and YES co-production aimed at teen audiences (Averbach, 2016b).
During this period, YES sold several additional series to Netflix. In
November 2016, Netflix acquired the international distribution rights for
2It should be noted that Netflix has never had any official presence in Israel. Rumors of local Netflix offices date
back to September 2015 (Tucker, 2015) but nothing official has materialized.
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the first season of the drama series Fauda (2015 –) (Kamin, 2016) and later
purchased the rights to the second season which was still in production. In
June 2017, Netflix announced that it would be producing The Good Cop
(2018 –) as an original series adapted from YES’ format of the same name
(Otterson, 2017). It was also announced that YES would remain an executive
producer on the project.
In contrast to these publicized distribution and co-production deals with
YES, the contours of Netflix’s relationship with cable provider HOT were
much less clear. In June 2017, HOT’s parent company Altice, which acquired
a controlling stake in 2011, signed a global partnership with Netflix covering
France, Portugal, Israel, and the Dominican Republic (Tartaglione, 2017).
According to the multi-year deal, Netflix content was to be made available on
all “eligible” Altice devices platforms in those markets. This partnership came
on the heels of Altice’s announcements that several of its subsidiaries includ-
ing HOT would be rebranding themselves as part of an effort to create
a unified global brand (Globes Staff, 2017). Although this rebranding was
expected to be completed by mid-2018, the rollout was delayed and no public
information was made available.
Netflix’s most public and significant relationship in the Israeli multi-channel
market is their collaboration with Partner Communications, the country’s second-
largest mobile phone operator. Following Cellcom TV’s successful launch in late
2014, Partner began developing plans for its own OTT service.3 In May 2017,
Partner announced that it would “be the first telecommunications company in
Israel to offer the Netflix service on its set-top box… and all the conveniences of
a Netflix button on [its device’s] s remote control” (Partner Communications,
2017). Less than two months after this initial announcement, in a press release
titled “Netflix is Now Truly Israeli,” the global SVOD platform described Partner
as its “first local partner” in Israel and said the local firm would “run a consumer
promotion and will allow members to sign-up and pay for Netflix through their
Partner TV bill” later that year (Netflix, 2017b).4 This collaboration obliged
Partner to heavily promote their association with Netflix and manage local
billing.5 For consumers, Partner TV’s package included linear channels and
3These efforts were hampered by multiple public setbacks. Most notably, in 2016, months of negotiations between
Partner and HBO fell apart when a lawyer working for Partner mistakenly emailed details of the ongoing talks to
an executive at HOT (Ziv, 2016b). When the legal dispute between Partner and HOT was resolved in
September 2016, HOT quickly announced its own content agreement with HBO meaning that YES was no longer
the market’s sole-distributor of HBO content (Perez, 2016b). In April 2017, Cellcom announced its own content
agreement with HBO which left Partner with limited options as they prepared to enter the multi-channel market
(Perez, 2017b).
4Although corporate press releases (Netflix, 2017b; Partner Communications, 2017) tout the first-of-its-kind
relationship between Netflix and Partner TV, in fact, these deals have become a standard business practice for
Netflix. These deals have become so standard that Netflix uses a variation of the same press release for each
territory. In 2016, Netflix proclaimed it was “now truly Turkish” (Netflix, 2016). The next year it similarly claimed it
was “now truly Greek” (Netflix, 2017a).
5During the time between the global expansion in early 2016 and the start of the collaboration with Partner in
mid-2017, Netflix did not undertake any significant independent local marketing efforts (Wayne, in press).
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VOD content at a base price of 69 shekel (US$20) permonth with access toNetflix
costing an additional 20 shekel (US$5) per month. With Netflix’s least expensive
monthly subscription priced at 39 shekel (US$10), in practical terms, Partner TV
entered the multi-channel market offering half-price Netflix subscriptions. Yet, it
quickly became clear that Partner had a significant amount of flexibility regarding
the economic specifics of their Netflix promotions. By early September 2017,
Partner stopped offering half-price subscriptions. Instead, new subscribers
received six months of “free Netflix.”
No matter the details, with a Netflix button on the service’s devices and
Netflix content prominently embedded throughout its promotional materials,
it was clear that Partner TV’s brand was directly tied to Netflix. Yet, in
collaborating with Partner, it was equally clear that Netflix was entering
a pay-television market that had become increasingly competitive over the
previous several years. Between the end of 2015 and mid-2017, both legacy
providers gave ground while the only alternative in the market saw signifi-
cant gains. During this period, HOT lost nearly 30,000 subscribers and saw
its market share drop to fifty-two percent (HOT, 2017, p. 9 (part B)). YES
lost 50,000 subscribers as its market shared dipped below forty percent
(Bezeq, 2017, p. 14). With 137,000 subscribers, Cellcom now controlled
nearly ten percent of the market after only three-and-a-half years of opera-
tion (Cellcom, 2017). Against the backdrop of these shifts, this research
presents a snapshot of executive responses to opportunities and challenges
within Israeli multi-channel industry at a particular moment in time.
Methods
This research is based on mid-level media industry field-work conducted
during the summer and fall of 2017. The data is primarily drawn from open-
ended qualitative interviews with ten Israeli television industry executives,
seven of whom work for Israel’s largest multi-channel providers. The remain-
ing three respondents are either former employees of these providers or
current employees of outside firms that work closely with the multi-
channel industry. Some executives were only willing to speak “on back-
ground.” Others would only participate on the condition that their names
and the name of their companies would not be used. The majority of these
interviews were conducted on-site at these providers’ corporate offices.
Following Herzog and Ali (2015), the author used a nondirective approach
which resulted in interviews that had characteristics associated with natural
conversation rather than a formal question-and-answer format. Interviews
lasted between sixty and ninety minutes and were transcribed by the author.
The executives in this sample (seven men and three women) hold a variety
of senior positions such as VP of regulation, head of programming, and VP
of content. It is important to note, however, that many Israeli television
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executives have extensive experience in several different parts of the industry.
For example, one respondent was a VP of regulation at the time of the
interview but had previously spent nearly a decade working in acquisition.
As a result, the respondents included in this research were able to discuss the
industry from a variety of perspectives not exclusively related to their current
duties.
Informed by Havens et al.’s (2009) “critical media industries approach,”
this research examines “how knowledge about texts, audiences, and the
industry form, circulate, and change; and how they influence textual and
industrial practices” (p. 273). To contextualize the data gathered from indus-
try executives, this research also examines publicly available industry docu-
ments, press coverage, and executive interviews in the public record. In
conjunction with the interview data, these additional materials allow this
work to offer a “helicopter view” of the Israeli pay-television market eighteen
months after Netflix’s global expansion. In the next three sections, interview
data illustrates the ways in which multi-channel executives understand
Netflix within this specific competitive landscape, their experiences buying
and selling content to Netflix, and their expectations that Netflix’s impact on
the local market will be limited.
Netflix as indirect competitor
For Israeli MVPD executives, Netflix’s global expansion represents an additional
source of competition in an increasingly competitive pay-television market. Yet,
none of the executives included in this research believe their companies are
directly competing with Netflix. When asked if she considers Netflix to be
a competitor, the head of regulation at one provider responds, “I think they’re
a competitor. A big competitor.” But at the same time, this executive is quick to
compare Netflix’s role in the Israeli market to the service’s role in other national
markets stating, “I know that abroad it is complimentary to multi-channel
television.” Asked to elaborate, she explains, “Netflix might be good enough
for some subscribers. But for sports, kids content, it’s not an answer.” When
asked a similar question about whether or not Netflix is a competitor, another
executive offered a similar answer saying, “Of course. Anything is a competitor.
So is Facebook.” Although one might expect newer providers to be those most
impacted by Netflix’s deal with Partner TV, like legacy executives, OTT execu-
tives do not describe Netflix as a direct competitor. As one executive explains, it
is the “magnitude of the platform, think different levels or different phases of
a platform, [that] defines [if] Netflix is a competitor … So it depends who you
are, what phase you are in, where you are in the market. I think that starting
a platform in a building way could benefit from Netflix.” These measured
responses are particularly notable given the multi-channel industry’s initial
reaction to Netflix’s global expansion. For example, two weeks after Netflix
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officially entered the Israeli market, regulation executives at HOT issued state-
ments claiming that “broadcast on Internet platforms” should be subject to
government regulation and framing this issue as “critically important to the
existence of the television industry in Israel” (Perez, 2016a).
Netflix as content distributor and content buyer
Israeli television executives view Netflix the content distributor as separate
from Netflix the content buyer. As a content distributor, the most significant
impact Netflix made on the local market was the decision to stop licensing
original content after 2016’s global expansion. When asked about this issue,
one VP of acquisition and distribution offers a characteristic response.
Describing local distribution deals for Netflix original series and other series
exclusively distributed by the SVOD, this executive complains, “If they’re
licensing a show like [CW’s] Riverdale [(2017 –)], they’re going to license it
exclusively in Israel. Not to mention they own stuff which of course they are
producing and will never license. So that’s a problem.” Another executive
offers a harsher assessment claiming that Netflix is “killing our acquisition.”
The problem, according to this executive, is Netflix’s unwillingness to negoti-
ate, “And if I would say once that maybe we have to pay more, that’s only
one stage, we have to pay more. But there is more than one case where even
if we want to pay more we can’t buy it. Like The Crown [(2016 –)], like
Narcos [(2015– 2017)].” For several executives, the problem of Netflix’s
unwillingness to continue licensing its original content is compounded by
the popularity of these shows with Israeli audiences.
In contrast to such negative feelings about Netflix as a content distributor,
industry attitudes toward Netflix as a content buyer are more positive. Netflix
has bought both original series and scripted formats from Israeli producers.
The executive who represents her company is such deals is quick to note how
easy it is to work with Netflix, “I like them a lot, they’re great clients.”
Discussing the “straight acquisition” deal for the first season of a well-
known Israeli drama series, this executive recalls how little Netflix wanted
from the show’s producers, “Apart from telling us to change the opening
credits and make them shorter, suited to binge … there was nothing.” Netflix
was more involved with the production of this show’s second season but still
took a largely hands-off approach, “They’re not commenting. They’re not in
a note giving capacity, but they’re showing us that they are interested.” As
a buyer, Netflix’s approach to scripted formats also differs from others in the
industry. Describing Netflix’s acquisition of one scripted format, this same
executive explains, “The deal we got was a straight to series order with only
two rewrites on our script and very little time for them to make a decision.
That would not have been possible before. We would’ve gone through
a network and been developing for two years before [Netflix].” Beyond
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Netflix’s simplified acquisition process, some executives also see Netflix
having broader positive impacts on the global content market. One observes,
“It’s a great time to be in [the distribution] business. I can call up Amazon, or
Hulu, or Showtime, or HBO, and say, ‘You don’t move fast or I’m going to
go with Netflix on this.’ And suddenly there’s a market for something there
wasn’t a market for three years ago.”
Despite the apparent ease of working with Netflix, many executives in the
industry question the logic of selling content to an international firm who
competes in the national market. One executive explains his resistance to
working with Netflix in terms of the local television production industry. He
says, “They don’t pay taxes here. They don’t hire employees here. They don’t
[produce] local content. They don’t spend a penny here.” This attitude,
which was expressed by multiple executives, helps explain some providers’
unwillingness to sell content to Netflix despite their history of success in the
global market.
Forecasting Netflix’s limited impact
In light of the recognition that Netflix is an additional source of (indirect)
competition in an increasingly competitive market and the negative reactions
to Netflix’s decision to distribute content exclusively through its own plat-
form or a local preferred partner, one might expect Israeli multi-channel
executives to be concerned about Netflix’s impact on the pay-television
market. Yet, these executives do not expect Netflix itself or the company’s
relationship with Partner TV to have any adverse effect on their own market
positions. Although the reasoning supporting such beliefs varies, executives
argue that Netflix will have little impact because of issues related to content,
the realities associated with being a global SVOD’s “local partner,” and the
ability of multichannel providers to effectively respond to new market
dynamics.
With regards to content, multi-channel executives believe they possess
a competitive advantage for two reasons. First, despite the popularity of
Netflix original series among Israeli audiences, industry consensus holds that
HBO is the most important international television brand in the local market.
For example, when asked if he would rather have Netflix content than HBO
content, one executive responds, “Of course not. Netflix usually isn’t as good.
Most of it is not good. Sometimes they luck out and it comes out well.” Another
executive makes a similar comparison saying, “Yesterday, I was watching [HBO
series] Big Little Lies [(2017 –)] and, again, I was amazed by how HBOmanaged
to reinvent television from series to series. That’s something that I can’t really say
about Netflix. I think Netflix is kind of going all over the place.” Although
Netflix’s choice not to build its brand identity around original content is part of
the SVOD’s broader strategy (Wayne, 2018), these comments are indicative of
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Israeli television executives’ tendency to think about Netflix as content, rather
than as a service or platform. Second, executives at legacy providers argue that
the Israeli television audience’s preference for Hebrew-language content is
a competitive advantage in its own right. Discussing national primetime ratings,
one executive observes, “The local [content] dominates. Good local [content]
will always outperform series from abroad. Always.”6 Given Israel’s history of
immigration and the socio-cultural importance of the Hebrew language, the
industry’s belief that it is insulated from threats posed by exclusively global
content providers is indeed supported by audience data.
Beyond strength of HBO’s brand and the national audience’s preference
for local content, executives also believe that the specific contours of the
partnership between Netflix and Partner TV limit the long-term viability of
this collaboration in two important ways. First, a central consequence of the
global agreement between Netflix and HOT’s parent company Altice is that
Netflix is unable to offer an exclusive partnership to any of HOT’s compe-
titors in the Israeli market. As a result, some industry insiders understand the
deal between Netflix and Partner to include, in the words of one executive,
“no exclusivity whatsoever.” Other executives think the deal might include
some exclusivity but only for a very limited period, “Let’s say they get, I don’t
know, six months exclusivity or twelve months. What about the long term?
I find it hard to imagine [Partner] will have long term exclusivity.” The lack
of exclusivity is particularly important because it opens the door for other
multi-channels to negotiate similar arrangements in the future. Second, as
a low-cost OTT service, industry insiders believe it is impossible for Partner
TV to pay for the privilege of being Netflix’s local partner and remain
economically solvent over an extended period of time. Describing the deal
as “platform sales,” one executive explains that Partner’s “six months of free
Netflix” promotion obligates them to subsidize their subscribers’ access.
Although subscriptions associated with platform sales are slightly discounted
(costing approximately ten percent less than a typical Netflix monthly sub-
scription), they are nonetheless a substantial expense for a low-cost OTT
provider. With Partner TV’s base monthly subscription priced at 69 shekel
(US$20) per month and discounted Netflix subscriptions costing 35 shekel
(US$10) per month, multi-channel executives do not believe Partner can
continue to subsidize new customers’ Netflix subscription indefinitely.
6Any attempt to perform a nation-level analysis of Israel’s media markets is complicated. Inside the Green Line that
separates Israel from the West Bank and Gaza, the total population is approximately 8.7 million. Roughly 20% of
this population are Arabs. Thinking about these demographics in the context of Meehan’s (1990) arguments
regarding the commodity audience, it is unsurprising that some viewers are more valuable than others. In Israel,
this reality manifests itself in a variety of ways. For example, Hebrew-language channels are largely uninterested
in measuring their Arab audience. In addition, opinion polls are routinely published only for the Jewish
population. As Bourdon and Ribke (2016) note in their analysis of television ratings in Israel, “In the end, the
figures of both the audience (ratings) and the public (polls), supposed to represent the whole nation, represent
only or mostly the dominant majority which imposes its notion of citizenship” (p. 170).
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Perhaps most importantly, Israeli multichannel executives expect Netflix to
have limited effects on the pay-television market because they believe their
companies are doing what it takes to stay competitive. One executive whose
service recently began offering subscribers access to HBO’s content library
explains, “Eventually, the perception is all that matters. I mean, if people are
thinking about [our platform] and now they know that HBO is available, they’ll
say, ‘Yeah. That’s a great proposition.’” Even executives at legacy providers
believe their companies are on the right track in spite of significant subscriber
attrition. In response to “the market shifting and the fact that you’re not
growing,” one legacy executive explains that her company is finding “other
ways to make up for that, doing things we’ve never cared about before, making
money off distribution, makingmoney off our [intellectual property], selling our
content to others.” Describing the legacy provider’s overall strategy, she says,
“The buzzword for us is just retaining [subscribers], or as somebody said,
‘Stagnation is the new up.’”
Discussion and conclusion
Although these interviews reveal a national television industry facing signifi-
cant uncertainty, Israeli multi-channel executives were hardly panicking in
the summer and fall of 2017. Despite subscriber bases that have been
shrinking since 2015, decision makers at legacy providers were confident
that OTT subscriber growth would slow as consumers realize lower monthly
fees are only possible by providing less content. Across the industry, many
executives believed that Cellcom TV was well established as the dominant
OTT provider. Most saw Partner’s arrangement with Netflix as the product
of desperation following several very public missteps and thought it unlikely
to succeed among Israeli consumers. Setting aside questions of whether such
confidence was misplaced or asking if executives would offer similar
responses in the following weeks and months, this research has two impor-
tant implications for scholarship addressing global SVOD platforms in other
national contexts.
In the broadest sense, the relationships between Netflix and Israeli multi-
channel providers confirm what media scholars have long claimed about
transitions between old and new media. New media forms do not replace old
ones; the interplay of old and new is an ongoing negotiation between
established and emerging practices. Rather than supporting naïve notions
of digital disruption ushering in the “post-TV” era, this research illustrates
the folly of presuming that internet distributed television will replace tradi-
tional distribution models. Put more plainly, Israeli multichannel executives
do not think Netflix is “killing” the local pay-television market. It would be
far more accurate to say that the entry of Netflix into this particular national
multi-channel industry appears poised to benefit some segments of the
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market at the expense of others. It also appears that Netflix is working with
some firms in ways that might well be at the expense of others. For legacy
providers, Netflix is yet another option for consumers in an increasingly
crowded OTT marketplace. At the same time, the global SVOD is also an
attractive potential buyer of local content whose patronage will doubtlessly
help mitigate the revenue loss caused by the declining number of subscribers.
For local OTT services who have yet to begin producing local content,
Netflix’s role as competitor or complimentary service are less clear. Future
research would do well to explore local OTT provider responses to global
SVOD penetration in order to better understand this developing segment of
the market.
In a more narrow sense, this research reveals how complicated and vari-
able relationships between global SVODs and national television industries
can be. Israel is a small, heavily regulated media market with only four
multichannel providers. And each of these providers deal with Netflix in
several different industrial contexts. Partner manages Netflix’s local billing.
YES recently launched YES Studios in an effort to solidify their international
reputation in the wake of Fauda’s success on Netflix. HOT’s parent company
Altice has a global branding agreement with Netflix although it remains to be
seen exactly what that will mean in the Israeli market. Given this complexity,
it seems likely that Netflix and other SVODs have similarly varied arrange-
ments with a greater number of providers in larger, less regulated markets. At
the same time, these relationships reaffirm the fundamental local-ness of
television even as digital technology reshapes the relations between national
and global industries. As Turner and Tay (2009) famously observe, “ … these
days the answer to the question, ‘What is television?’ very much depends on
where you are” (p. 8). Moving forward, this is precisely why mid-level
fieldwork will become increasingly important for scholars seeking to under-
stand contemporary television. As digital technology reorganizes national
markets and global SVODs spend more on international content to fill
their libraries, executives working within local industries must simulta-
neously meet consumer demand at home and take advantage of new global
opportunities. As such, examinations of multi-sited industrial practices are
positioned to address the broader implications of the interpenetration of
local and global television industries.
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